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From the Margins Back to the Core: Jetten's Discursive Repositioning of The Netherlands within EU Foreign and Security Policy

On February 23, 2026, Rob Jetten was sworn in as Prime Minister of the Netherlands, ending a turbulent period during which Dutch credibility within the European Union had taken a serious hit. His predecessor, Dick Schoof, led a coalition dominated by Geert Wilders’ far-right PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid or Party of Freedom), a party whose leader publicly called the EU a 'monster' and whose presence in government, as one diplomat bluntly put it, contributed to a perception that ‘nobody listens to the Netherlands anymore’. Jetten’s government marks something close to a reversal: a centrist, pro-European minority cabinet that has made re-engagement with Brussels its defining foreign policy priority.

 

This report analyses Jetten’s official discourse on X (formerly Twitter) during his first month in office, from late February 2026 through late March 2026. That period was marked by overlapping crises, including the ongoing war in Ukraine, U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, and intensifying pressure across Europe for greater strategic autonomy. Jetten’s posts during this period constitute a deliberate rhetorical project. They go beyond communicating government positions. They reconstruct a Dutch identity within Europe, grounded in a phrase he repeats: the Netherlands as a “driving force.”

The question guiding this analysis is how Rob Jetten's discourse constructs a narrative of Dutch re-engagement in EU foreign and security policy, and which rhetorical strategies he deploys to signal the Netherlands' leadership role within that framework? Under the Schoof cabinet, the Netherlands had largely become an outlier in Europe. Otjes (2025) characterises the Schoof coalition as “the most right-wing government in the Netherlands since the postwar era,” noting weaker coalition unity than in any Dutch government in recent memory. The PVV-dominated coalition sought an opt-out from EU migration policy, proposed slashing development aid by more than a third, and cut funding for science and higher education. Wilders, who until 2024 had openly supported Dutch withdrawal from the EU, remained the coalition’s dominant political force even though Schoof officially led the government. Teunisse et al. (2025) described Wilders as the “shadow prime minister,” whose repeated public interventions undermined Schoof’s authority and damaged the Netherlands’ reputation in Brussels.


The coalition collapsed in June 2025 after just eleven months, and the snap elections that followed brought Jetten’s Party D66 a narrow victory. On the campaign trail, Jetten was explicit about his intentions: he wanted to “bring the Netherlands back to the heart of Europe.” He now faces an unusual dual challenge. As head of a minority government with 66 of 150 parliamentary seats, he must convince a fragmented domestic audience that costly investments in defence and energy are worth the associated austerity. At the same time, he needs to reassure European allies, many of whom watched the Netherlands drift toward the EU’s margins during the Schoof period, that The Hague is back as a dependable partner. His X account is where both audiences meet.


This report examines whether Jetten’s discourse has moved beyond routine expressions of solidarity toward active claims of leadership. A notable feature of this repositioning is Jetten's tendency to integrate energy policy into his security narrative, reflecting his prior role as Climate and Energy Minister. This kind of “security-energy nexus” has gained traction in European policy circles: in January 2026, the think tank E3G argued that European offshore energy infrastructure should be treated as dual-use security assets integrated into NATO planning. Earlier, the EU Institute for Security Studies had called for a “whole-of-system approach” to energy security as a defence requirement. The Netherlands’ traditional reputation as a fiscally conservative, trade-oriented state, and its leadership of the so-called “Frugal Four” that opposed deeper EU fiscal integration, make the current rhetorical shift particularly notable.



Values-Driven Reset: Moral Language and Ukraine as the Anchor

Jetten’s posts during his first month reveal three interconnected rhetorical strategies. The first is a values-driven reset, anchored in Ukraine. The second is active alliance-building through a rapid diplomatic tour of European capitals. The third is the integration of energy policy into the security narrative as a foreign policy tool. Jetten’s opening move as Prime Minister was to call President Zelensky. Not Brussels, not Berlin, not Paris. Kyiv. De Vries (2026), in a Monocle profile published two days after the inauguration, noted that the call “carried a message that needed no elaboration: whatever had recently happened in The Hague…Dutch support for Ukraine was not among the casualties.” Indeed, Jetten’s first notable X post from Kyiv used stronger language than anything else he posted that month.


 “It’s an honour to be in Kyiv today standing by the side of President @ZelenskyUa. Just as the Netherlands has stood shoulder to shoulder with the Ukrainian people for years now. Because they are not just fighting for their own freedom and security, but for the freedom and security of Europe as well. For our European democratic values and standards. Their fight is our fight too. Ukraine deserves our full support.”


The phrase “their fight is our fight too” collapses the distance between Ukraine and the Netherlands. Ukrainian resistance is framed as a direct European concern, not a distant conflict that the Dutch merely support. The repeated use of “shoulder to shoulder,” which also appears in his meeting with the Ukrainian Prime Minister later that day, signals physical proximity and equal standing rather than a donor-recipient relationship. The concluding call to “stand firm,” “remain vigilant,” and “avoid getting distracted” reads less like a statement of support and more like an instruction to European allies who might be wavering.


Under Schoof, Dutch military aid to Ukraine continued uninterrupted. Indeed, it was a policy with broad parliamentary support that was never seriously contested. But Schoof himself never visited Kyiv, and his public communication about Ukraine was sparse and technocratic, with little appeal to values or moral purpose. Jetten's approach is a deliberate departure. He situates Dutch involvement within a civilizational argument, presenting support for Ukraine not as a strategic calculation but as a moral obligation.


The meeting with Ukrainian Prime Minister Svyrydenko, posted the same day, translated this framing into practical terms. Jetten noted discussions on “the restoration of the energy infrastructure after this winter and how Dutch companies can contribute,” as well as Ukraine’s reforms in the context of EU accession and the return of Ukrainian children abducted by Russia. His closing line echoed the Zelensky post: “The Netherlands stands shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine.” The repetition of the phrase suggests an effort to brand the Dutch position as one of solidarity (Appendix B).



From Observer to Driving Force: The Diplomatic Tour

Following the Kyiv visit, Jetten embarked on a remarkably dense diplomatic circuit for a new Dutch Prime Minister. Over ten days, Jetten visited Warsaw, Paris, and Berlin before attending his first European Council in Brussels later that month. Each stop was accompanied by a social media post serving a specific purpose. For example, after meeting with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Warsaw, Jetten wrote:


“Poland is a key ally when it comes to European support for Ukraine, which must be unwavering. For years Poland has led by example when it comes to building a strong and secure Europe that can defend itself. It is with good reason that the Netherlands and Poland concluded an agreement in July to step up our defence cooperation” (Appendix C).


He then closed with: “The Netherlands seeks to be a positive, driving force in Europe, for our security, freedom and prosperity.” The phrase “driving force” recurs in his European Council post and in variations across several other communications. It is a brand statement: the Netherlands is no longer a reluctant participant in European integration but an engine driving it forward. The contrast with the Schoof period, when the Netherlands sought opt‑outs from common EU policies, is striking and appears deliberate.


The Warsaw post also links defence cooperation to economic integration. Jetten notes that “you can’t have a strong European defence without a solid economic foundation” and calls for removing “unnecessary barriers in the single market.” This connection appears in nearly all of his posts: security and economics are presented as inseparable.


In Paris, the rhetoric escalated. In a post written in French (itself a diplomatic signal; Jetten has posted in Dutch, English, French, and German throughout his tour, tailoring the language to each audience), he invoked a French proverb about friendship between equal souls, then shifted to concrete policy.


“At France’s request, the Netherlands has deployed an air defence frigate in the eastern Mediterranean. In this way, we are working together to protect our allies and partners in the region against Iranian attacks. We also addressed the latest developments in Ukraine and reaffirmed our unwavering support for Kyiv, particularly within the framework of the Coalition of Volunteers. The current tensions and conflicts remind us that our freedom and security are not a given. It is reassuring to see the efforts underway to strengthen our European defence. President @EmmanuelMacron’s proposal to work together on consolidating the European nuclear deterrent is an important step forward in this regard” (Appendix D).


The endorsement of European nuclear deterrence discussions is the sharpest policy signal from Jetten’s first month. Hellendoorn (2026) noted that this was a notable departure, with the Dutch government announcing that it “would join French-led discussions on European nuclear deterrence.” This was a step that would have been nearly unthinkable under the Schoof coalition, in which Wilders’ PVV was skeptical of deeper European defence integration. By embedding this announcement in a post about shared values and deployed military assets, Jetten treats what is, in fact, a major policy shift as a natural extension of existing cooperation. The Berlin visit followed a similar pattern, though the language was more grounded in existing institutional ties. Posting in both Dutch and German, Jetten emphasised longstanding Dutch-German military integration.


“Germany and the Netherlands have been joining forces in the areas of security and defence for decades. We share a military corps and a tank battalion. Our defence industries are also closely intertwined through supply chains in North Rhine-Westphalia. Strengthening our defence is one of the top priorities of my government” (Appendix E).


He then described the Netherlands and Germany as “voortrekker” in delivering “lifesaving air defence” through the Coalition of the Willing. “Voortrekker” is a Dutch word meaning pioneer or trailblazer. Rather than framing the Dutch role as supportive or contributory, the term asserts leadership. Covering his priorities, the post also tied European cooperation directly to economic ambition: “We need European cooperation for a strong economy with which we can realise and pay for our great ambitions.”



Energy as Security: Integrating the Energy Transition into the Defence Narrative

Another persistent theme in Jetten's posts is the refusal to treat energy policy as separate from security. As Minister for Climate and Energy Policy in the fourth Rutte cabinet, Jetten built his political identity around this integration, and he has carried it directly into his role as Prime Minister. The agenda he presented at his first European Council meeting in Brussels illustrates how deliberately he applies this framing.


“Today I am in Brussels for my first European Council meeting. With international developments unfolding rapidly there are plenty of issues that demand our attention. The Netherlands wants to be a driving force and play a constructive role in moving the EU forward. Topics on the agenda: The situation in Iran and its impact on energy prices. The importance of financial support for Ukraine. Strengthening EU defence to protect our freedom and security in Europe. How we, as the EU, effectively can manage migration flows towards Europe. Enhancing our competitiveness so that Dutch companies can create more jobs and for a strong EU in a rapidly changing world” (Appendix F).


By placing Iran’s energy price impact, Ukraine support, EU defence, migration, and competitiveness in a single, sequential list, Jetten frames them as components of a single, interconnected problem rather than as separate policy areas. The coalition agreement, titled “Getting to Work!,” makes this linkage explicit. Hellendoorn (2026) noted that the new Dutch government “views implementation of the recommendations of both Enrico Letta’s 2024 report on the future of the European single market and Mario Draghi’s 2025 report on EU competitiveness as crucial.” The EIB meeting on March 23 made the link between climate and defence even more direct.


“The European Investment Bank (@EIB) plays a key role in strengthening the EU economy by providing loans relating to climate action, the energy transition, and European defence and security” (Appendix G).


Here, climate action, energy transition, and defence occupy the same syntactic position. They are presented as coequal functions of EU economic strength. For a Prime Minister who built his early career on climate policy, this framing works in two ways. First, it gives his climate agenda a security justification that is harder for domestic hawks to dismiss; second, it presents the Netherlands as a country where economic, environmental, and military thinking are integrated rather than in competition. The EU competitiveness conference post reinforced this connection, with Jetten stating that “affordable, sustainable energy” is among the “key steps” needed to “secure an even stronger position for Europe on the world stage.” Sustainable energy is framed not as climate obligation but as a tool for geopolitical positioning (Appendix J).



Balancing Act: The United States and the Iranian Crisis

Two other posts illustrate how Jetten adjusts his tone depending on his audience. His meeting with the U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands, Joe Popolo, was framed to reassure Washington while keeping the European frame intact. He called the United States “an important ally for Europe and the Netherlands and crucial with respect to our security and prosperity,” adopting a warmer, more cooperative tone than the friction that has characterised Polish-U.S. relations during the same period. The mention of King Willem-Alexander’s upcoming U.S. visit signals continuity in the transatlantic relationship (Appendix H).


His post on the Iranian community in the Netherlands, written in Dutch and clearly aimed at a domestic audience, offers a window into how Jetten handles a crisis that spans domestic and foreign policy. He described meeting members of the Iranian diaspora, emphasized Dutch commitment to “de-escalation and pressure on the Iranian regime,” and asserted that “ultimately, only the Iranians can determine the future of their country.” The closing line, “The Netherlands stands firmly behind the Iranian people,” echoes the “shoulder to shoulder” language used in the Ukraine posts. The same solidarity framework is applied to a different crisis, giving his foreign policy voice a consistent shape (Appendix I). Both episodes, the measured reassurance offered to Washington and the solidarity extended to the Iranian diaspora, illustrate the same underlying rhetorical project: Jetten constructs a consistent Dutch foreign policy identity by applying his values-driven framework across audiences, whether allied governments or vulnerable communities, thereby reinforcing the Netherlands' claim to principled leadership within EU foreign policy.


 

In less than a month, Jetten’s online discourse has done considerable work to reposition Dutch foreign policy identity. Compared with Jetten’s intensive first‑month messaging, Schoof’s public communication was more limited and technocratic in tone. The aim seemed to focus on constructing a specific image: the Netherlands as a values-driven leader within EU and NATO structures.


Jetten consistently grounds his international engagement in moral language, particularly regarding Ukraine. This is not decorative. It distinguishes his government from the transactional rhetoric of the Wilders-dominated Schoof era, in which European solidarity was treated as something to be bargained over rather than championed. Second, his diplomatic tour and the accompanying language claim a specific role for the Netherlands: not a follower or a frugal obstructionist, but a “driving force” and “voortrekker.” The endorsement of European nuclear deterrence discussions is the most concrete example of this shift. Hellendoorn (2026) suggests this may be among the most closely watched shifts in The Hague by other European capitals. Third, the fusion of climate, energy, and security into a single narrative framework is the rhetorical move most recognizably his, likely shaped by his years as climate minister. It allows him to present expensive defence and energy investments to his domestic audience as interconnected necessities rather than competing budget lines. Rather than advancing a climate policy agenda per se, Jetten deploys the energy transition as a foreign policy instrument, presenting the Netherlands as a country where economic, environmental, and strategic thinking are integrated and making the case for Dutch leadership within EU structures.


Whether this rhetoric translates into lasting policy change remains uncertain. Jetten leads a minority government with only 66 seats, and every piece of legislation requires cross-aisle negotiation. The coalition’s proposed defence spending increases are tied to cuts in social spending, particularly in healthcare and pensions, which have already provoked criticism across the political spectrum (Hellendoorn, 2026). If the domestic cost of his European ambitions becomes electorally toxic, the rhetoric may outpace policy. For now, the discursive shift is evident in Jetten’s early communications. Allies in Brussels, Berlin, and Paris will have received a clear signal: The Hague is back in the European conversation and intends to lead.




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